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Karl Marx never offered fully developed critiques of law or the state, let
alone theories of jurisprudence or legal history.1 Many Marxists
subsequently made the attempt—but efforts to articulate Marxian2
I thank Umut Özsu for his encouragement, support, and comradely critiques as I developed and refined
the arguments in this essay. I am also grateful to Jonathan Baughman, Matthew Dimick, Nate Holdren,
Amanda Jaret, David Kaib, Karl Klare, Sam Menefee-Libey, Jack Schlegel, Tony Smith, and Camila
Vergara for their critiques and comments on earlier drafts.
1. “[N]owhere in the Marxist classics do we find a well-formulated, coherent and sustained theoretical
analysis of the state.” Bob Jessop, Recent Theories of the Capitalist State, 1 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 353,
357 (1977).
2. I use the adjective “Marxist” when referring to specific political and intellectual currents and
“Marxian” when referring to Marx’s writings and others’ interpretations of them. On the distinction
between “Marxian theory” and “Marxisms” past and present, see PAUL MATTICK, THEORY AS
CRITIQUE: ESSAYS ON CAPITAL (2018). For a rigorous but accessible restatement of Marx’s critique and
Marxian theory see TONY SMITH, BEYOND LIBERAL EGALITARIANISM: MARX AND NORMATIVE SOCIAL
THEORY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 73-130 (2017). For an introduction to Marx’s “critique of
political economy as a critical theory of society,” see FREDERICK HARRY PITTS, CRITIQUING
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conceptions of law and state have often foundered on the limitations of
relying on compressed or polemical claims in Marx’s early texts.3
Nevertheless, the elaboration of Marx’s critique of political economy
necessarily involves critical inquiry into law. Legal relations are mutually
constitutive with other social relations; law is a crucial moment in the
totality4 of capitalist social relations. Critical inquiry into capitalism’s
history requires attention to (among other things) law and jurisprudence. In
the words of historian Jairus Banaji,
the forcible creation and regulation of labour-markets are an intrinsic
feature of capitalism and Marxists need to abandon the naïve view that
law somehow stands “outside” this process and is not intrinsic to it.
Duncan Kennedy and his colleagues in “Critical Legal Studies”
demonstrated as much in the 1980s.5
The Critical Legal Studies6 (CLS) movement was not Marxist.7 In the
1970s and 1980s, participants in the first wave of the movement criticized
legal liberalism from a variety of radical and anti-establishment positions.8
CAPITALISM TODAY: NEW WAYS TO READ MARX 3-6 (2017).
3. Christopher Tomlins, Marxist Legal History, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF HISTORICAL LEGAL
RESEARCH 519 (2018) (foregrounding early polemics by Marx and Engels as the “requisite
prolegomenon” to the Marxist critique of the state). On the limits of Marx’s early writings, see SIMON
CLARKE, MARX, MARGINALISM AND MODERN SOCIOLOGY 86-91 (1991). See generally PATRICK
MURRAY, MARX’S THEORY OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 3-84 (1988) (on the development of the young
Marx’s critical thought).
4. “[T]he capitalist mode of production can only be grasped as a complex totality. However, this is not
the complexity of relations of structural interdependence, it is the complexity of an historical process, a
process of class struggle which develops on the basis of contradictory historical foundations.” Simon
Clarke, The Global Accumulation of Capital and the Periodisation of the Capitalist State Form, inOPEN
MARXISM 1: DIALECTICS AND HISTORY 133-150 (Werner Bonefeld et al. eds., 1992).
5. JAIRUS BANAJI, THEORY AS HISTORY: ESSAYS ON MODES OF PRODUCTION AND EXPLOITATION 15
(2010).
6. This article focuses on the first wave of CLS in North America, but it must be remembered that critical
legal scholarship was and remains an international endeavor. For background, see Peter Fitzpatrick &
Alan Hunt, Critical Legal Studies: Introduction, 14 J. L. & SOC’Y 1 (1987); Alan Hunt, The Critique of
Law: What Is “Critical” about Critical Legal Theory?, 14 J. L. & SOC’Y 5 (1987); Martin Krygier,
Critical Legal Studies and Social Theory—A Response to Alan Hunt, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 26
(1987).
7. “[C]ritical legal scholarship . . . is left-wing, yet it is deeply critical of Marxism.” James Boyle, The
Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 685, 688 (1984).
Over the period 1977-1983 Mark Tushnet, originally one of the more Marxism-adjacent attendees of the
Conference on Critical Legal Studies, seemingly came to the conclusion that “a distinctively Marxist
theory of law has failed.” Morton J. Horwitz, Mark Tushnet, Legal Historian, 90 GEO. L. J. 131, 134
and passim (2001). See generally Akbar Rasulov, CLS and Marxism: A History of an Affair, 5
TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 622 (2014) (summarizing and critiquing the “standard account” of the
relationship between CLS and Marxism).
8. On CLS as a historical phenomenon, see Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A Political History,
100 YALE L.J. 1515 (1990); NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 435-67 (1995);
Pierre Schlag, Critical Legal Studies, in THE OXFORD INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LEGAL
HISTORY 295 (Stanley Katz ed., 2009); Rasulov, supra note 7. On legal liberalism see LAURA KALMAN,
THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM (1998). For contemporaneous accounts of CLS, see
MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987); THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE
CRITIQUE (David Kairys ed., 1982); Alan Hunt, The Theory of Critical Legal Studies, 6 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1986); Duncan Kennedy & Karl Klare, A Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies, 94
YALE L. J. 461 (1984); John Henry Schlegel, Notes Toward an Intimate, Opinionated, and Affectionate
2
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Many participants claimed the mantle of the Legal Realists or
acknowledged them as an influence.9 They presented their task as the
demystification and destabilization of legal liberalism. However, despite
notable scholarship (and a certain amount of notoriety), by the mid-1990s
no less of a critical luminary than Duncan Kennedy had pronounced the
movement moribund.10 CLS included figures who were sympathetic to or
considered themselves Marxists, but their influence and their engagement
with Marx ebbed with the changing trajectory and fortunes of the
movement.11 Other figures—including some of the most prominent ones,
such as Roberto Mangabeira Unger—rejected Marxism as an untenably
monocausal, teleological, and structurally rigid theory of society.12
Over the life of the movement, critical legal scholars came to dismiss
Marxism as inappropriate for their tasks. Many were wedded to the
dichotomization of Marxism into two strands: “scientific” and “critical.”13
The former was held to be dogmatic, historically determinist, and illiberal
in outlook, while the latter was critical, pluralist, and receptive to syncretic
encounters with psychoanalysis, existential philosophy, and literary theory.
But the tendency of the movement over the course of its generative period
in North America (roughly from 1977 to the mid-to-late 1980s) was toward
the rejection of Marxism per se, both as a label and as a theoretical guide
(or even foil).14 Although many influential contributors to CLS were
conversant with Marxism, the thrust of CLS as a whole was ultimately non-
or anti-Marxist.15
Law and state, on the one hand, and production and exchange, on the
other, are mutually constitutive within the broader array of capitalist social
relations.16 A critique of one is necessarily a critique of each. This insight
was not lost on members of CLS, indebted as they were17 to the Legal
History of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV. 391 (1984).
9. Debra Livingston, ‘Round and ‘Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical Legal
Scholarship, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1669 (1982); Mark Tushnet, Post-Realist Legal Scholarship, 1980 WIS.
L. REV. 1383 (1980).
10. DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION {FIN DE SIÈCLE} 9-10 (1997). Compare id., with
Mark Tushnet,Critical Legal Theory (Without Modifiers) in the United States, 13 J. POL. PHIL. 99 (2005)
(arguing that CLS critiques have been internalized or absorbed by large sectors of the legal academy).
11. Rasulov, supra note 7, at 630 and passim. An example of how closely linked some participants in
CLS were with contemporaneous Marxist theorists may be found in Stuart Hall & Alan Hunt, Interview
with Nicos Poulantzas, MARXISM TODAY 194 (1979).
12. See, e.g., ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY: ANTI-NECESSITARIAN SOCIAL
THEORY IN THE SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY (1987); Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical
Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561 (1982).
13. See, e.g., Schlegel, supra note 8, at 393 n.9.
14. Rasulov, supra note 7, at 625-28.
15. Id. at 632.
16. ”[R]elations of production themselves take the form of particular juridical and political relations . . .
which are not mere secondary reflexes, nor even just external supports, but constituents of these
production relations.” ELLEN MEIKSINS WOOD, DEMOCRACY AGAINST CAPITALISM: RENEWING
HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 27 (1995).
17. Cf. Duncan Kennedy, The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault, 15 LEGAL STUD. F. 327 (1991)
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Realist tradition.18 Both traditions developed that insight in terms of
political economy (though in very different registers), with a focus on the
distribution of wealth and the effects of power upon that distribution.
Absent from any such approach, however, is a critique of the very concepts
that populate political economy and mediate social behavior in capitalism.
Marx’s contribution was to offer such a critique “through a systematic
reconstruction of the essential determinations (‘social forms’) of the
capitalist mode of production”19—a dynamic and contradictory system,
riven with conflict and contingency, but dominated by capital’s essential
social forms. Any critical theory of society that does not foreground capital
necessarily omits that which is central, dominant, and dominating in our
social world.
I argue that the CLS critique—or, rather, the package of critiques that
emerged over the course of the movement—is insufficient to ground an
emancipatory critique of law, which must incorporate a specifically
Marxian critique of capitalism.20 The systematic critique of political
economy must include an account of the legal constitution of commodities,
production relations, and money. It must also include a thorough
consideration of how law is mutually constitutive with other forms of
capitalist social relations. CLS’s inattention to capital renders its legacy
inadequate for the purposes of guiding critical legal inquiry. Without a
critique of capital, the CLS package cannot account for the features of our
social world that are foregrounded by Marx’s critique. These include the
socially and ecologically destructive consequences of capitalism’s
inescapable drive toward expansion, growth, and extraction; an inverted
social world in which the products of humans’ activities assume dominant
and dominating forms, constraining and mediating subjectivities and action
alike; and the manifestation of capitalist social relations through the
constitutive antagonism between capital and labor (the capital relation). The
imperative to valorize capital pervades (in however mediated and
contingent a manner) the totality of social relations, including law and the
state. Overcoming capitalist unfreedom is possible only through the
profound transformation of capitalist social relations.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I recapitulates the most salient and
distinctive features of CLS critiques: the critique of legal indeterminacy,
(surveying, inter alia, discursive and analytic resources in the Realist tradition that are available for use
in critical legal inquiry).
18. See, e.g., Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL.
SCI. Q. 470-94 (1923); ROBERT L. HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW: PUBLIC CONTROL OF PRIVATE
GOVERNING POWER (1952).
19. SMITH, supra note 2, at 73.
20. Although it is beyond the scope of this essay, I contend that the “law and political economy”
movement of the present day must also answer to the same criticism. See, e.g., Jedediah Britton-Purdy
et al., Building a Law-and-Political-Economy Framework: Beyond the Twentieth-Century Synthesis,
129 YALE L.J. 1784 (2020).
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critiques of the distinction between law and politics, and critiques of law’s
role in reproducing social hierarchy and domination. These critiques
represented a profound dissatisfaction with the liberalism of the midcentury
American legal academy.21 However, they were often developed in tension
with Marx’s own immanent critique of liberalism. Parts II and III advance
an alternative reading of Marx, one that can be brought into generative
contact with the CLS critique of Marxist legal theory for the sake of future
attempts to develop left legal thought. I survey some of the most important
non-classical interpretations of Marx and Marxisms in Part II. Part III
focuses on the critique of political economy and the theorization of capital
as Marx’s distinctive contributions to social theory. The critique of capital
illuminates the ways in which the accumulation of value constrains human
agency and is constitutive of the systematic unfreedom encompassing the
lives of the vast majority of people on the planet. Part IV draws upon recent
work by the philosopher Tony Smith, who argues that left-liberal criticisms
of inequality and unfreedom under capitalism are limited by inattention to
the role of capital in the constitution of our social world.22 Smith’s critique
is applicable to any normative social theory that does not foreground capital
in its account of domination and unfreedom. Any reconstruction of legal
theory and legal history from the left must, I contend, confront Smith’s
challenge. I conclude by reflecting on how a new encounter between critical
legal inquiry and Marx’s critique of political economy can contribute to the
reconstruction of left legal theory.
I hope to encourage those who are interested or invested in the CLS
project to revisit Marx’s critique without prejudging it. I also hope to
encourage those who are committed to building upon Marx’s critique to
read CLS carefully and sympathetically, with an eye toward incorporating
their insights into the systematic critique of law and state. I am not interested
in chastising the “crits”23 for not being Marxists.24 Students of Marx and
critical legal scholars have much to learn from each other. I want to spark a
long-overdue discussion about the reconstruction of a thoroughly critical
and avowedly emancipatory theory of law.
I. THE CLS PACKAGE
First-wave CLS critiques were premised on commitments shared, to
21. See generally JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM (1964); DUXBURY, supra note 8, at 205–99; KALMAN,
supra note 8; LAURA KALMAN, YALE LAW SCHOOL AND THE SIXTIES: REVOLT AND REVERBERATIONS
(2006).
22. SMITH, supra note 2.
23. The term was and is multivalent—by turns defiant, affectionate, ironic, or dismissive—depending
on the context of the utterance. I use it here only as a convenient shorthand.
24. For examples of such chastisement, see Stefan Sciaraffa, Critical Legal Studies: A Marxist
Rejoinder, 5 LEGAL THEORY 201 (1999); E. Dana Neacsu, CLS Stands for Critical Legal Studies, If
Anyone Remembers, 8 J.L. & POL’Y 415 (2000).
3
Hunter: Critical Legal Studies and Marx’s Critique: A Reappraisal
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository,
394 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 31:2
varying extents, by multiple authors. The first was the claim that law is
constitutive of individual consciousness;25 that is, the categories that
dominate our personal and social lives are molded by legal rules and
institutions. The second was that legal actors are makers—witting or not—
of social relations and social hierarchies.26 The interpenetration of law and
society and the legal constitution of persons and consciousness are instances
of praxis or “social-world producing activity.”27 Finally, legal rules and
institutions are the outcomes of contingency and conflict.28 They are neither
instantiations of timeless concepts, nor are they products of principled
deliberation and abstract institutional design. The crits rejected the old
formalist conceit—revived by latter-day textualists calling themselves
constitutional originalists29—that the law forms a coherent unity with its
own immanent logic in which principles may be discerned, and from which
rules may be deduced. Multiplicity and incoherence are evident throughout
statutes, cases, and doctrine.30
These commitments yielded several core claims when brought into
contact with courts, the legal profession, and legal education. The first was
that law is characterized by indeterminacy. In many cases, the available
legal materials do not exhaust the possibilities for an outcome. Legal rules
do not determine legal outcomes, nor do they constrain judicial-making in
a robustly predictable way. Law as a whole is internally contradictory; the
content of one area of the law may be at odds or cross-purposes with that in
another.31 Indeterminacy can inhere in the social context in which legal
materials are encountered—it is not necessarily a feature of those materials
themselves. As such, no amount or kind of formal specification is
guaranteed to prevent indeterminacy.
The second core claim was that law is a form of politics.32 It is not a
socially distinctive mode of reasoning.33 Law and politics are
25. Peter Gabel, Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62
TEX. L. REV. 1563 (1983); Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984);
David M. Trubek, Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. REV. 575
(1984).
26. Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 591
(1982).
27. Karl Klare, Law-Making as Praxis, 40 TELOS 123, 124 n.4 (1979).
28. THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE, supra note 8.
29. Mark Tushnet, A Note on the Revival of Textualism in Constitutional Theory, 58 S. CAL. L. REV.
683 (1985).
30. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1975);
Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351 (1973).
31. Boyle, supra note 7; Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE
L.J. 997 (1984); Gordon, supra note 25; David Kairys, Law and Politics, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 243
(1983); Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra note 30; Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law,
73 CALIF. L. REV. 1151 (1985); Tushnet, supra note 29. For a rejoinder from the mainstream see
Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462
(1987).
32. THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE, supra note 8.
33. They associated this claim with the “legal process” school (of Hart and Sacks vintage). See, e.g.,
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interpenetrated, and they construct social hierarchies and orders. When
applying this frame to the concept of rights, the crits argued that “rights
talk” conceals and naturalizes injustice, rather than preventing it.34 Law
does not always constrain the operation of power relations and hierarchies;
it also veils them. Furthermore, legal rules and materials cannot be
understood outside of their historical contexts and trajectories; they do not
obtain in a socio-historical vacuum.35 Legal texts are not reliable guides to
the trajectories of the social conflicts that preceded them.
Finally, legal liberalism privileges an abstract and idealized rational
subject—whereas individuals are in fact embedded in overlapping histories
and communities.36 In criticizing the form of subjectivity privileged by
mainstream liberal thought, participants in CLS came into conflict with the
nascent right-wing law and economics movement37 (and resembled some of
the agonists in contests between liberal individualists and
communitarians).38 Critical legal history, in particular, played a crucial role
in highlighting the importance of consciousness and social situatedness. For
example, Robert Gordon’s emphasis on law’s capacity to be “constitutive
of consciousness” has had an important impact on the work of multiple
cohorts of legal scholars.39
The crits articulated their critiques in response to what they saw as a
fainéant legal academy.40 They emphasized the absent credibility of an
enterprise that had come unmoored from its social context. They did not see
the cultivation of students’ critical faculties taking place in law schools.
Instead, they saw charades and exhaustion: the rote catechization of
nostrums about the rule of law, the ritual humiliations of law school
hierarchy, and the collective failure to grapple with the law’s uneven record
as a means for pursuing progressive social outcomes.41 The liberal legal
academy was not magisterial—it was shambolic and sad. Legal liberals
Boyle, supra note 7.
34. Paul O’Connell, Human Rights: Contesting the Displacement Thesis, 69 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 19, 21
(2018). See generally Anthony Chase, The Left on Rights: An Introduction, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1541
(1983); Morton J. Horwitz, Rights, 23 HARV. C.L.-C.R. L. REV. 393 (1988); Kennedy, supra note 26.
35. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF
LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1977); DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE & FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT
(2006); Morton J. Horwitz, The Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87 HARV. L. REV.
917 (1974); Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205
(1978).
36. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought: Essays on the Fetishism of
Commodities, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 939 (1984). See also Corinne Blalock, Neoliberalism and the Crisis of
Legal Theory, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71, 74 ff. (2014).
37. Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics Movement, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 1-13 (1987).
38. See, e.g., COMMUNITARIANISM AND INDIVIDUALISM, (Shlomo Avineri & Avner De-Shalit eds.,
1992).
39. Gordon, supra note 25, at 109.
40. See, e.g., John Henry Schlegel, Searching for Archimedes—Legal Education, Legal Scholarship,
and Liberal Ideology, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 103 (1984).
41. Kennedy, supra note 26; Unger, supra note 12.
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“were like a priesthood that had lost their faith and kept their jobs. They
stood in tedious embarrassment before cold altars.”42
II. MARXISMS, ORTHODOX AND DISSIDENT
The plurality and heterogeneity of Marxism (or Marxisms) were reflected
in many CLS texts. In some cases, “Marxism” denoted the shopworn
official ideologies of the U.S.S.R. and its satellites, the structuralism
associated with figures such as Louis Althusser,43 or Marxian economics44
conducted as a positivist science. However, in other moments (often earlier
on in the trajectory of the movement), “Marxism” referred to alternative
critical traditions whose inquiry focused on subjectivity, social relations,
and modes of experience. In such moments, the Marxism of interest to the
crits was what had come to be known as Western Marxism.45 This current—
or confluence of currents—was an important reference point for crits
seeking to articulate critiques of law’s role in the constitution of capitalist
social relations while avoiding the pathologies of traditional Marxism.
In this context it also important to note the “dissident Marxisms”46 that
flowered immediately before the period in which CLS developed, such as
autonomism, operaismo (“workerism”),47 and the neue Marx-Lektüre
(“new reading of Marx”)48—the last of which would inspire attempts to
elaborate “form-analytic” theories of the capitalist state as an essential form
of capitalist social relations.49 Furthermore, this period was one in which
decolonial and anti-imperialist Marxisms had global currency,50 activists
42. Unger, supra note 12, at 675.
43. LOUIS ALTHUSSER, FOR MARX (Verso 2005) (1965). See generally Duncan Kennedy, Antonio
Gramsci and the Legal System, 6 ALSA F. 32 (1982); Klare, supra note 27.
44. See, e.g., CLARKE, supra note 3, at 95.
45. See, e.g., DICK HOWARD & KARL E. KLARE, THE UNKNOWN DIMENSION: EUROPEAN MARXISM
SINCE LENIN (1972). On the term “Western Marxism” see PERRY ANDERSON, CONSIDERATIONS ON
WESTERN MARXISM (1976).
46. Aaron Benanav & John Clegg, Crisis and Immiseration: Critical Theory Today, in THE SAGE
HANDBOOK OF FRANKFURT SCHOOL CRITICAL THEORY 1629-48 (Beverley Best, Werner Bonefeld, &
Chris O’Kane eds., 2018).
47. See STEVE WRIGHT, STORMING HEAVEN: CLASS COMPOSITION AND STRUGGLE IN ITALIAN
AUTONOMIST MARXISM (2002).
48. See, e.g., HANS-GEORG BACKHAUS, DIALEKTIK DER WERTFORM. UNTERSUCHUNGEN ZUR
MARXSCHEN ÖKONOMIEKRITIK (1997); HELMUT REICHELT, ZUR LOGISCHEN STRUKTUR DES
KAPITALBEGRIFFS BEI KARL MARX (1973); VALUE: THE REPRESENTATION OF LABOUR IN CAPITALISM,
(Diane Elson ed., 1979). For an introduction see Ingo Elbe, Between Marx, Marxism, and Marxism:
Ways of Reading Marx’s Theory, VIEWPOINT MAGAZINE (2013),
https://www.viewpointmag.com/2013/10/21/between-marx-marxism-and-marxisms-ways-of-reading-
marxs-theory/.
49. See, e.g., STATE AND CAPITAL: A MARXIST DEBATE, (John Holloway & Sol Picciotto eds., 1978).
For a synoptic, retrospective view, see Soichiro Sumida, Die Zusammenfassung der bürgerlichen
Gesellschaft in der Staatsform, 2017 MARX-ENGELS JAHRBUCH 41-60 (2018).
50. See, e.g., SAMIR AMIN, ACCUMULATION ON A WORLD SCALE: A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORY OF
UNDERDEVELOPMENT (1974); JAMES BOGGS & GRACE LEE BOGGS, REVOLUTION AND EVOLUTION IN
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1974); CHERYL PAYER, THE DEBT TRAP: THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND AND THE THIRD WORLD (1975); MARXISM IN LATIN AMERICA FROM 1909 TO THE PRESENT: AN
8
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and scholars pursued pathbreaking inquiries into the mutual constitution of
race and capital,51 and Marxist feminists explored the articulation of
critiques of gendered and sexual domination with the critique of political
economy.52 All told, CLS’s historical moment witnessed an efflorescence
of new developments in theoretical production and analytic insight within
Marxism.
Some dissident Marxisms revived the immanent critique of political
economy developed by Marx in Capital53 and related texts54—a critique
long overshadowed by interpretations that viewed Marx as contributing to
political economy.55 They also responded to the inadequacies and
distortions of the official Marxisms of established communist parties.
Despite substantial differences in method and focus, they departed from
official Marxism in many respects. On this point it is important to note that
the critique of value was a particular focus of the neue Marx-Lektüre.
Through close study of Marx’s texts they rearticulated Marx’s critiques of
value, commodities, and money.56 Marx’s critique of value makes clear that
capitalism is a system in which labor is abstracted through specific forms
of social relations, such that individuals are dominated by the particular
ways in which they relate with one another—ways that appear as the
independent movements and properties of commodities. What are
commonly referred to as economic phenomena—the compulsion of the
market that forces workers to seek employment; competitive pressures on
firms that compel capitalists to reduce labor costs or revolutionize
production; the imperative for capital to seek out (or coercively create) new
and expanded markets and investment opportunities—are nothing other
ANTHOLOGY, (Michael Löwy ed., 1980). See also ANDRE GUNDER FRANK, CAPITALISM AND
UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA (1967).
51. See, e.g., JAMES BOGGS, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: PAGES FROM A NEGRO WORKER’S
NOTEBOOK (1963); CEDRIC J. ROBINSON, BLACK MARXISM: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK RADICAL
TRADITION (1983).
52. See, e.g., Heidi I. Hartmann, The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism: Towards a More
Progressive Union, 3 CAPITAL & CLASS 1 (1979); Christine Delphy, The Main Enemy, 1 GENDER
ISSUES 23 (1980); Lise Vogel, MARXISM AND THE OPPRESSION OF WOMEN: TOWARD A UNITARY
THEORY (1983).
53. 35 KARL MARX, MARX & ENGELS COLLECTED WORKS: CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY, VOLUME I (1994).
54. See Karl Marx, Results of the Direct Production Process, in 34 MARX & ENGELS COLLECTED
WORKS: ECONOMIC MANUSCRIPTS OF 1861-1864 (1994); KARL MARX, 28-29 MARX & ENGELS
COLLECTED WORKS: THE “GRUNDRISSE” (1986–1987). Close study of these texts, along with the
different drafts and editions of Capital (especially with respect to differences in the first chapter on
commodities), was central to the neue Marx-Lektüre and related currents. See PITTS, supra note 2, at
21-137. See also Diane Elson, The Value Theory of Labour, in VALUE: THE REPRESENTATION OF
LABOUR IN CAPITALISM 115 (1979); PATRICK MURRAY, THE MISMEASURE OF WEALTH: ESSAYS ON
MARX AND SOCIAL FORM (2016). The locus classicus for study of the value-form is ISAAK ILLICH
RUBIN, ESSAYS ON MARX’S THEORY OF VALUE (Black and Red 1972) (1928).
55. MATTICK, supra note 2, at 72-101.
56. Cf. MURRAY, supra note 3; MURRAY, supra note 54. “Even in his lifetime Marx was constantly
exasperated by the failure of his readers and critics to grasp the significance of his analysis of the value-
form.” CLARKE, supra note 3, at 98.
7
Hunter: Critical Legal Studies and Marx’s Critique: A Reappraisal
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository,
398 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 31:2
than the activities and relationships of social individuals. Such a critique
understands “‘the economy’ as an historical social construct, dependent for
its existence on humans’ perpetuation of certain modes of conceptually
mediated action.”57 They are contingent, historically-specific human
creations that have, in turn, come to dominate humans themselves. Escaping
capitalist unfreedom is not simply a matter of redistributing surplus value,
but of abolishing or transforming the social relations through which the
production and realization of value have come to dominate society.
Capitalism is not simply a juridico-political arrangement in which value is
maldistributed or stolen from workers. Its injustices may not simply be
remedied through a restructuring of law in order to redistribute the surplus
expropriated from exploited workers.58
Meanwhile, many crits were eager to distinguish themselves from
anything resembling an orthodox-Marxist insistence on the necessity of
certain social outcomes. Kennedy argued that the outcomes of legal
“struggle are not preordained by any aspect of the social totality.” For him,
“the outcomes within the law have no ‘inherent logic’” and a theory
detecting such a determinist logic imposes systematicity where there is
none.59 (This “social indeterminist position”60 represented the confluence of
the rejection of legal formalism and the rejection of structuralism alike.) For
Unger, Marxist social explanations superimpose rigid conceptual structures
that are vitiated by people’s experience of (and constructive participation
in) particular social contexts.61 Both Kennedy and Unger understood
Marxism to deny the ineluctable centrality of consciousness, which for them
was a locus of normative concern and the font of social contingency. Some
major players in the early days of the Conference on Critical Legal
Studies—such as Karl Klare, Mark Tushnet, and Peter Gabel—all either
identified as Marxists (at least initially) or had themselves closely studied
varied currents in Marxism. Klare, whose work on jurisprudence and
judicial decision-making62 foregrounded the concept of social reproduction
and the state’s relation to it, presented arguments63 drawing upon a deep
understanding of Western Marxism.64 Tushnet initially defended a Marxist
57. MATTICK, supra note 2, at 77.
58. For further development of these claims, see infra Part III, §§ B-C.
59. In the same passage, Kennedy notes that law “is an aspect of the social totality, not just the tail of
the dog”—in other words, law is not just a superstructural reflection of an economic base. Kennedy,
supra note 26, at 599.
60. Schlegel, supra note 8, at 396.
61. UNGER, supra note 12. “Unger rejects Marxism and other structural theories on the ground that they
defy historical experience.” Hugh Collins, Roberto Unger and the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 14
J.L. & SOC. 387, 390 (1987).
62. See, e.g., Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern
Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1977).
63. Klare, supra note 27.
64. See, e.g., HOWARD & KLARE, supra note 45.
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conception of legal theory but later rejected Marxist social explanations as
analytically inert.65 In their critiques of rights and the separation of powers,
other crits often echoed claims made by theorists working in or adjacent to
Marxist currents—sometimes explicitly so.66 At other times, marxisant
vocabularies were conjoined with inquiry conducted in an existential
register, interrogating the contradictory production of social meaning and
social alienation through the mediation of legal relations.67 As a bloc,
however, the crits increasingly tended to maintain a studied ambivalence
about Marx, let alone Marxism.68
III. MARX’S CRITIQUE AND THE CHALLENGE IT POSES TO CRITICAL
LEGAL INQUIRY
According to the Marxian critique of political economy, as it was
rearticulated by various dissident Marxists, “the economy” is neither natural
nor overdetermined by timeless principles of human sociality per se.
Phenomena appearing as economic are manifested in determinate relations
between real social individuals. The Marxian critique detects, in the
dynamics of our society, the continued reproduction of the capital relation
(the relation between capital and labor). This relation is mediated by
struggle between capital and labor—both of which find themselves, as a
consequence of the imperative to valorize capital, in a relationship of
mutuality and reciprocal antagonism. As such, social relations as a whole
are constitutive of a totality. They are not just a congeries of contingently
churning social relations. Such a totality is incomplete and shot through
with contradiction. It reproduces through social antagonism, not in spite of
it.69 The Marxian critique is not reductively determinist. Rather, it describes
the determination (often incomplete, usually contradictory) of the
specificity of social relations by social form. In other words, Marx’s critique
exposes the historically specific character of capitalist social relations,
65. See infra Part III, § D.
66. See, e.g., Chase, supra note 34.
67. See, e.g., Gabel, supra note 25.
68. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 36; Mark Tushnet, Marxism as Metaphor, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 281
(1983). Tushnet’s later appraisal of Marxism contrasts starkly with earlier writings in which he occupied
a more orthodox-adjacent position. See, e.g., A Marxist Analysis of American Law, 1 MARXIST
PERSPECTIVES 96 (1978). See also Boyle, supra note 7.
69. Martin Jay claims that the concept of totality has fallen into “strong disrepute.” MARTIN JAY,
MARXISM AND TOTALITY: THE ADVENTURES OF A CONCEPT FROM LUKÁCS TO HABERMAS 514 (1984).
See also ERNESTO LACLAU & CHANTAL MOUFFE, HEGEMONY AND SOCIALIST STRATEGY: TOWARDS A
RADICAL DEMOCRATIC POLITICS 125 (1985) (arguing that “[t]he incomplete character of every totality
necessarily leads us to abandon, as a terrain of analysis, the premise of ‘society’ as a sutured and self-
defined totality”). However, it is important to stress that the social totality as apprehended by the critique
of political economy is not a monolith. See Lars Heitmann, Society as “Totality”: On the Negative-
Dialectical Presentation of Capitalist Socialization, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF FRANKFURT SCHOOL
CRITICAL THEORY 589 (Beverley Best, Werner Bonefeld, & Chris O’Kane eds., Jacob Blumenfeld
trans., 2018); Chris O’Kane, The Path of Negative Totality, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF MARXISM
(Sara R. Farris, Beverly Skeggs, & Alberto Toscano eds., 2020).
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distinctly and ineluctably expressed through social forms peculiar to
capitalism.
This Part offers a critical restatement of some of the aspects of Marx’s
critique that are most salient for the purposes of legal inquiry. I have
attempted to avoid writing polemically. However, there is no concealing
that what follows flows from my preferred reading of Marx’s critique,
which I contend may be read in a manner that is responsive to or resonant
with many of the crits’ concerns. I hope to motivate a reconsideration of the
prospects for melding critiques of political economy with critiques of legal
development, jurisprudence, and legal education. For that reason, my
exposition of Marxian theory will also refer to important themes and claims
in the crits’ considerations of Marxism. I focus on common readings that
informed many crits’ objections to or dismissals of Marx. The most
important of these relate to the contradictory constitution of social relations;
the mediation of social relations by the form of value and the consequent
inversion of the social totality; and the juridico-political form of appearance
of this inverted social world.
A. The Social Constitution of Capitalism
Marx’s critique is frequently dismissed as an instance of economic
determinism.70 According to this objection, Marx’s critique is analytically
self-limiting; it elevates the economic over everything else, including the
political and the legal. Central to this claim is the idea that Marxian inquiry
discharges propositions about economics rather than critiques of the
concepts populating liberal social thought. The objection may be split in
two: an objection to class-reductionism, and an objection to
“economism”—the privileging of production as the first cause of the social.
However, Marx’s critique does not focus on class as an economically-
determined marker of identity or consciousness, nor does it conceive of
class in terms of the distribution of goods to particular groups.71 It focuses
on the class character of capitalist society, which can be reproduced only
through the struggle between those controlling the means of production, and
those selling their capacity to labor so that they may go on living. Class
antagonism is part and parcel of a society in which most people do not
control land, machines, plant, and other desiderata of production. Such
people have few or no alternatives to seeking work for wages. Struggles
between labor and capital are necessarily constitutive of capitalist society
as such.
70. SMITH, supra note 2, at 68–9.
71. WERNER BONEFELD, CRITICAL THEORY AND THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY: ON
SUBVERSION AND NEGATIVE REASON 101-20 (2014); Salar Mohandesi, Class Consciousness or Class
Composition?, 77 SCI. & SOC’Y 72 (2013).
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Marx’s critique rejects the “profound category mistake”72 of treating the
economic and the political as separate domains of social activity. It
emphasizes the “reciprocal causality”73 between juridico-political relations
and economic relations, not their fictive separation.74 It is true that Marxism
has long been associated with the economistic base/superstructure
metaphor, in which the forces and techniques of production reside in the
base, determining legal and political relations as mere reflections.75 The
metaphorical demarcation between an economic base and a juridico-
political superstructure—whose content is determined by changes or shifts
in the base—can be found in many twentieth-century Marxisms; this has
indeed been a hindrance to the elaboration of Marxian critiques of law.76
The base/superstructure metaphor is, however, a concept derived from
classical political economy. Marx did not sufficiently criticize it in his own
scattered statements about law and the state.77 The persistence of the
metaphor in twentieth-century Marxism gave many contributors to CLS
many opportunities for dismissing Marx’s critique as overly schematic and
rigidly deterministic.
However, capitalism’s constitutive social relations are mutually
constitutive. Production is not an unmoved mover. Marx’s critique traces
the ways that, despite the mutual constitution of different social relations,
those social relations come to be dominated by capital and its imperatives.
The desiderata of the reproduction of the capital relation impose severe
constraints on contending political formations. Departures from capitalism
are possible only at the cost of the destruction of huge amounts of wealth
and the intensification of social conflict. The antagonistic reproduction of
capitalist social relations does not reflect a social ontology in which agents’
choices are made for them (as an economistic account would have it). It
discloses an inverted or “topsy-turvy” social world in which persons’
relations with one another assume fetishized forms that come to dominate
them.78
B. Social Relations and Social Form
The question of social form79 is at the root of a major misreading of Marx,
72. SMITH, supra note 2, at 189.
73. Id. at 185.
74. Id. at 183-91, esp. 187-89.
75. Klare, supra note 27; BONEFELD, supra note 71, at 165-66.
76. Marc W. Steinberg, Marx, Formal Subsumption and the Law, 39 THEORY & SOC’Y 173, 174-75
(2010). See, e.g., G. A. Cohen, Base and Superstructure: A Reply to Hugh Collins, 9 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 95 (1989); HUGH COLLINS, MARXISM AND LAW (1982) (debating the usefulness and tenability
of the base/superstructure metaphor).
77. BONEFELD, supra note 71, at 165-92. See also WOOD, supra note 16, at 49-53.
78. BONEFELD, supra note 71, at 53-75; SMITH, supra note 2, at 98-116.
79. The discussion of social form in this section draws upon CLARKE, supra note 3, at 49-143; MURRAY,
supra note 54; SMITH, supra note 2, at 73-160; and Elson, supra note 54.
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one which inhabits not only many foundational CLS texts but also
dismissals found throughout non- and anti-Marxist scholarship. This is the
notion that Marx propounded a substantialist or physicalist theory of value,
in which labor is objectified (literally) in physical commodities through
productive labor.80 Such a view is indeed absurd. But Marx’s critique of the
form of value makes clear that value is not a physical attribute of this or that
commodity; it is a form of relations among people. It is a social form, not a
physical form: “to understand value is to understand a social practice and a
discourse that is part of it.”81
In capitalism, relations between persons are constantly mediated by
relations between things, nowhere more so than in the case of value’s most
abstract form: money. The money form mediates the exchange of values—
representations of elements of abstract, socially necessary labor time—in
the meeting between buyer and seller.82 The seller who brings a commodity
to exchange possesses a particular commodity that is the result of discrete
production processes; but in successfully effecting a sale, the seller
represents that commodity as an equivalent portion of an abstract form—
social labor, labor in the abstract.83 Moreover, there is a superficial
complementarity—indeed, legal equality—of roles between buyer and
seller. But this equality conceals the unevenness of the exchange when it
takes place between worker and capitalist.84 Capitalists do not force
individual workers to sell their labor-power to them, and yet individual
workers find that they must do just that, as I argue in Part IV.85
Commodities are socially validated through exchange, not through their
production alone. Under generalized commodity production, value is
realized through the conjoined circuits of production and exchange. In the
pursuit of profit under conditions of competition capitalists will tend to
overproduce commodities, precipitating crises in which commodities are
devalued and further production is halted (regardless of social need). As
such, the mediation of social relations between persons by things is at the
root of capitalism’s tendency toward crisis86 as well as the fetish character
of commodities87—that is, commodities appearing to govern their own
behavior and even that of people. Money, commodities, and property appear
to be independent actors that impose their requirements upon people, while
people appear to act on behalf of or under the compulsion of things like
capital and wages. Capitalist and worker alike are subject to the domination
80. SMITH, supra note 2, at 63.
81. MATTICK, supra note 2, at 81.
82. CLARKE, supra note 3, at 104-8.
83. Id. at 105.
84. ”Between equal rights force decides.” MARX, supra note 53, at 243.
85. On this point see infra Part IV.
86. CLARKE, supra note 3, at 218, 233.
87. Id. at 103. See also SIMON CLARKE, MARX’S THEORY OF CRISIS (1993).
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of a social form that is inherently crisis-prone.
It might seem that alienation, fetishism, and the mediation of social
relations by money describe a deplorable sedimentation of illusions
separating us from ourselves and from one another. For Marx, however,
alienated labor and the fetish-character of commodities—in which the
relations among people appear in the form of relations between things, that
is, commodities—make up the actual state of affairs in capitalist sociality.
As Marx put it, they “are forms of thought expressing with social validity
the conditions and relations of a definite, historically determined mode of
production, viz., the production of commodities.”88 We are all dominated by
a real abstraction89 deriving from concrete human activities predicated on
the (historically specific) social validity of the categories of generalized
commodity production. In Marx’s words, “individuals are now ruled by
abstractions whereas previously they were dependent on one another.”90
The production of any given commodity in order to gain money for the
acquisition of other commodities is predicated on the (quite reasonable)
assumption that that’s what everybody else is doing:
Commodity fetishism is the form of appearance of particular social
relations of production, but it is not merely an illusion. It really is the
case that the relations between individuals and things are determinate,
while the relations between particular people are accidental. . . . [I]t
really is the case that social relations are mediated by relations between
things. The illusion lies . . . in the belief that this social power derives
from the commodity as a thing, rather than being seen as a particular
form of alienated social relations.91
In Marx’s critique, the working class is not celebrated because it produces
value; it is recognized for its centrality in the reproduction of capitalist
social relations. The critique of the form of value discloses the inverted
character of our historically peculiar social world. The worth of things—
almost all things—is discernible not through their usefulness to those who
might need them, but only through their social validation through exchange
for the universal equivalent form—money—mediating their circulation and
presupposed by their production.
Alienated labor does not consist in the producer’s exertion and
exhaustion, still less in the transfer of some kind of substance from worker
to product. Commodities are potential use-values that obtain exchange-
value in the context of their sale: labor is socially validated only in the
exchange of value as represented by money. Capital accumulation thus
requires the unimpeded flow of the conjoined circuits of production and
88. MARX, supra note 53, at 91.
89. BONEFELD, supra note 71, at 121-43.
90. 28 MARX, COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 54, at 101.
91. CLARKE, supra note 3, at 103.
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exchange. The alienation of the waged worker consists in the fact that she
is not interested in making something useful, but rather in making
something that the capitalist can exchange for the universal equivalent form
of value—money. The mediation of exchange by money is felt as palpably
by the worker as it is by the capitalist. The former’s reproduction is
dominated by the need to sell her labor-power—that is, to acquire wages—
in order to gain access to things she needs in order to survive—almost all
of which are commodities. The latter can hold on to wealth only by
constantly seeking to accumulate more capital (a process that, from the
capitalist’s perspective, appears not to involve independent contributions on
the part of workers, even though production entails the exploitation of labor
to a greater or lesser degree). In both cases value mediates social relations.
People can only relate to one another through things, and money appears to
be the only objective measure of worth. Under “the laws of self-expanding
value which rule the world . . . nobody is free, neither the workers nor the
capitalists.”92 Alienated labor under conditions of exploitation and
immiseration—the conditions that are the best that most people can hope
for under capitalism—is the compulsory production of things one may not
even want in order to acquire money to pay for what one needs.
Marx’s theory of value is not a contribution to political economy but to
its critique. Glossing Marxian value theory in the 1970s, Diane Elson
chiastically referred to it as a “value theory of labor” (rather than a labor
theory of value) in order to establish its discontinuity with political
economy.93 Marx’s theory of value has also been characterized as a
“monetary theory of value” (to emphasize the centrality of money and the
importance of exchange).94 The basic point here is that Marx emphatically
does not claim that “class struggle involves workers attempting to recapture
a portion of the value created through their labor for their own use and
enjoyment, while the capitalist class uses the state as an instrument to allow
the continued ‘theft’ of the surplus.”95 Exploitation and domination are
intrinsic to any conceivable arrangement of capital accumulation.
Capitalists will always try to get the most out of the commodity they
purchase from workers (their labor-power) by extending the working day,
imposing stricter work discipline, or by speeding up or mechanizing labor
processes. If they fail to do so, they will be undercut by competitors who
do. The central injustice of capitalism is not that workers are deprived of
92. C.L.R. James (as J.R. Johnson), Production for the Sake of Production, 1943 WORKERS PARTY
BULLETIN 198, 207 (1943), https://www.marxists.org/archive/james-
clr/works/1943/04/production.htm.
93. Elson, supra note 54.
94. MICHAEL HEINRICH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THREE VOLUMES OF KARL MARX’SCAPITAL 63-64
(2012).
95. Kirstin Munro, “Social Reproduction Theory,” Social Reproduction, and Household Production, 83
SCI. & SOC’Y 451, 453 (2019).
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the full fruits of their labor, but that they are structurally compelled to
produce commodities (to be sold by the capitalist) in order to acquire the
money that is required for access to commodities—and almost all of their
wants and needs are accessible only as commodities. Moreover, we are all
compelled to participate in the reproduction of capital as a social relation.
This results in the apparent absurdity of what we take to be a non-agent—
capital—appearing to enjoy agency at the expense of social agents
themselves. And yet capital is nothing but the product of humans’ social
activity. The unpropertied either make and re-make capitalism or else suffer
hunger, deprivation, and misery.96 The propertied make and re-make
capitalism or else risk financial ruin and joining the ranks of the
unpropertied.
C. Value, Struggle, and Emancipation
Two important political consequences flow from the critique of the form
of value. First, emancipation is not possible through an institutionalized
recognition of workers’ contributions to the total social production of
value.97 The working class is indeed central to the critique of political
economy. But the centering of wage-labor in Marx’s critique of capitalism
is not the brittle optimism of a rigid worldview. It is the product of a ruthless
analysis and the expression of a desperate hope. Those who seek and rely
on wages—immiserated, brutalized by the geno- and ecocidal desiderata of
capitalist production, and often surplus to the productive requirements of
capital accumulation—cannot emancipate themselves through the
universalization of waged labor. “To be a productive laborer is,” as Marx
put it, “not a piece of luck, but a misfortune.”98 Workers can only
emancipate themselves by struggling to abolish capitalism, not to reform it.
Second, the critique of the form of value discloses the impossibility of a
stably redistributive capitalism, and the impossibility of planning and
coordinating collective production—with reference to capitalist metrics,
that is. No universal basic income, system of worker-owned cooperatives,
or participatory budgeting scheme can displace or overcome the imperative
to valorize capital.99 All such schemes are system-immanent with respect to
capitalism; they do not posit its abolition. Value must be understood not in
terms of the distribution of the social product but the constitution of social
96. A point also emphasized by WOOD, supra note 16, at 28-9, 109, and passim.
97. This point is also worth noting in the case of the chaotic and incoherent form taken by production in
the U.S.S.R. See DONALD A. FILTZER, SOVIET WORKERS AND STALINIST INDUSTRIALIZATION: THE
FORMATION OF MODERN SOVIET PRODUCTION RELATIONS, 1928–1941 (1986); HILLEL TICKTIN,
ORIGINS OF THE CRISIS IN THE USSR: ESSAYS ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF A DISINTEGRATING
SYSTEM (2016); Christopher J. Arthur, Epitaph for the USSR: A Clock Without a Spring, 30 CRITIQUE:
J. SOCIALIST THEORY 91 (2002).
98. MARX, supra note 53, at 510.
99. SMITH, supra note 2, at 279-334.
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relations themselves. The valorization imperative can only be overcome,
not tamed. The sublation of existing social relations—neither their
affirmation nor their amelioration—is the ultimate horizon of any
emancipatory politics informed by Marx’s critique.
The crits did not center this reading of value relations, focusing instead
on the occlusion of power by ideology. They deftly demonstrated how law
can cloak, conceal, or naturalize relations of power. They did not, however,
attend to the social inversion of capitalism, in which social relations are
mediated by the products of social activity, such that people really do relate
to one another through things, things themselves really do appear to be
invested with social power, and the acquisition, hoarding, and exchange of
money dominate all persons. Let us explore the legal dimensions of this
inverted world.
D. Form, Formalism, and Reification
Many crits argued that Marxists essentialize the targets of their
critiques.100 They held that when Marxists talk about law, they reify it “as a
single coherent block”101 rather than a disputed terrain of rules, norms,
meanings, and practices. Marxist legal theory, on this view, ironically finds
itself mired in the idealism of an older jurisprudence—even as Hohfeld, the
Realists, and the crits themselves had moved on to an attentiveness to the
contradictions between social conditions, on the one hand, and particular
rules, norms, and discourses, on the other.102 Marxist legal theory smuggles
a counterfeit formalism back into the law—meaning that “the only
candidate for a viable Marxist [legal] theory is one that deals with the form
and not the content of the law.”103 As such, in the early 1980s Mark Tushnet
argued that Marxist theory failed to survive contact with consensus
reality.104 The historical experience of the Warren Court, for example,
seemed to contradict Marxist models of social determination and held forth
the promise of realizing progressive social aims within the practice of
law.105 According to this argument, any viable Marxist legal theory must
acknowledge the distinctive logics and grounds of particular social spheres
(such as law)—perhaps by emphasizing the “relative autonomy” of law,
such that its specificity is not simply determined by other factors (e.g.
relations or production or property ownership).106
100. See Tushnet, supra note 68, at 281-82.
101. Kennedy, supra note 36, at 995.
102. This argument is developed in Rasulov, supra note 7.
103. Tushnet, supra note 68, at 289-90.
104. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 68.
105. See, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 7.
106. See, e.g., Isaac D. Balbus, Commodity Form and Legal Form: An Essay on the “Relative
Autonomy” of the Law, 11 L. SOC’Y REV. 571 (1977). Balbus’s article is also noteworthy for the
attention it draws to Evgeny Pashukanis’s commodity-form theory of law, which proposes a homology
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The appeal of the concept of relative autonomy—whose most prominent
Marxist exponent was Nicos Poulantzas107—is found in its analytic
tractability: it is suitable for investigation within and of particular
conjunctures. This tractability brings with it a certain level of risk. Wielded
carelessly, the concept of relative autonomy can lose critical bite. Some
Marxian critics argue that it borrows heavily from liberal conceptions of
social ontology.108 It has a certain social validity in that it reflects the
appearance of the distinction between the political and the economic. But
one should be careful not to accept the division of the juridical from the
economic as a natural fact.109 The separation of law and state from relations
of production and exchange is contingent and unstable, and it is reproduced
through struggle—the same struggle that is constitutive of capitalist social
relations in their totality. This separation serves to depoliticize and
naturalize capitalism, such that it seems banal and unremarkable—when it
is, in fact, historically peculiar, contradictory, and potentially contestable.110
Tushnet suggested that a choice had to be made between fidelity to Marxism
and describing reality. But why not ask, instead, whether the Marxian
critique necessarily precludes the possibility that individuals and
collectivities may act in such a way so as to pursue the transformation of
social relations? Capitalist social relations comprise a totality—but it is a
totality riven by contradictions, whose specificities are constituted through
antagonism and reproduced through struggle.
Tushnet argued that Marxists could only account for the Warren Court
with reference to the relative autonomy of legal institutions and practices
from production relations.111 Arguably, it would be easier still to understand
the experience of the Warren Court as illustrative of the wide variability in
the content of the legal and political relations constitutive of capitalism.
Nevertheless, the crits were not satisfied by relative autonomy or other
theoretical frameworks that understand law to be a (mere) determination of
between the legal form and the commodity form of value. EVGENY B. PASHUKANIS, LAW AND
MARXISM: A GENERAL THEORY (1989). While not widely adopted on its own terms, Pashukanis’s
theory remained an important touchstone for many engaged in the critical recovery of alternative and
dissident Marxisms. See, e.g., John Holloway & Sol Picciotto, Introduction: Towards a Materialist
Theory of the State, in STATE AND CAPITAL: A MARXIST DEBATE 1, 18-24 (John Holloway & Sol
Picciotto eds., 1978).
107. See NICOS POULANTZAS, STATE, POWER, SOCIALISM (1978).
108. See, e.g., Simon Clarke, Marxism, Sociology, and Poulantzas’s Theory of the State, in THE STATE
DEBATE 70 (Simon Clarke ed., 1991).
109. SMITH, supra note 2, at 187-89; Holloway and Picciotto, supra note 106, at 3-10.
110. “Marx’s point is that the enforced separation of state and civil society is an institutionalized
illusion.” MURRAY, supra note 3, at 32. On the separation of the political from the economic in
capitalism, see Ellen Meiksins Wood, The Separation of the Economic and Political in Capitalism, I/127
NEW LEFT REV. 66 (1981).
111. Horwitz, supra note 7, at 133. Cf. BOB JESSOP, STATE THEORY: PUTTING THE CAPITALIST STATE
IN ITS PLACE 85–104 (1990) (summarizing Marxist debates about the relative autonomy of state and
capital); Christopher Tomlins, How Autonomous Is Law?, 3 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 45 (2007)
(exploring the ramifications of the distinction between law and society posited by arguments for law’s
autonomy).
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capitalism. In a frequently cited passage, Klare argued that any such view
imposes a “preformed theoretical structure” on inquiry into law, suggesting
that any conclusions derived from such a view are unfalsifiable and circular.
“A particularly embarrassing case of circularity is the ease with which we
are told that legal outcomes and processes derive from the underlying
relations of production or property ownership, as though production
relations or property ownership could meaningfully be defined without
reference to legal rules.”112
Insisting as they did on law’s independent capacity for the “social
construction of reality,”113 the crits were impelled by the momentum of their
antiformalist critique to bend the stick too far. It is indeed the case that the
constitution of capitalist social relations is legal and political as well as
economic; law, state, and economy are all moments in the totality of social
relations. Attentiveness to social form is not formalism.114 The former does
not impose an anterior metaphysics upon social reality. This is clear, for
example, from the attention that Marx paid to the juridical dimensions of
the commodity form and to the processes through which maximum-hour
legislation was pursued and enacted.115 The specification and manifestation
of economic relations are necessarily political and legal processes. The
identification of the state with the political form of the class struggle116 does
not produce the proposition that the state is subservient to or an instrument
of capital. It is an entailment of the apprehension of social relations in their
complex (and contradictory) totality—relations that give rise to determinate
and historically-specific social forms.
Marx’s critique of political economy is not, by itself, a sufficient critique
of law.117 Kennedy argued that Marx “defetishized commodities . . . but
only partially defetishized law itself.”118 But the tentative and gestural
character of Marx’s scattered statements about law does not entail the
proposition that the Marxian critique of political economy only permits us
to conceive of law “as a single coherent block” or as a mere “embroidery
on the surface of the essential structure” of capitalist production relations.119
Continued elaboration upon and debate over Marx’s critique of capital can
illuminate the centrality of legal and political relations to the constitution of
capitalism as an inverted totality of social relations.
112. Karl E. Klare, Critical Theory and Labor Relations Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE
CRITIQUE 61, 67 (David Kairys ed., 1982). But see CLARKE, supra note 3, at 67.
113. Klare, supra note 112, at 68.
114. See MURRAY, supra note, at 54.
115. Steinberg, supra note 76, at 177-80.
116. Simon Clarke, State, Class Struggle, and the Reproduction of Capital, in THE STATE DEBATE 183,
194 (Simon Clarke ed., 1991).
117. Steinberg, supra note 76, at 178-80.
118. Kennedy, supra note 36, at 995-96.
119. Id. at 995.
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IV. THE THEORETICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AN INADEQUATE CONCEPTION
OF CAPITAL
The persistence of contradiction and conflict in capitalist societies does
not negate the proposition that social forms substantially determine the
content of social relations. Rather, such contingency and conflict
demonstrate the variability—indeed, the radical-yet-bounded
indeterminacy—of the content of political and legal relations under
capitalism.120 As the philosopher Tony Smith has recently argued,
normative social theories that fail to attend to the determinations of the form
of value will inevitably fail to fully comprehend the causes and character of
capitalist unfreedom.121
Of course, many prominent contemporary normative social theories do
not uncritically celebrate capitalism. They may understand it as the
necessary generator of the wealth that can underwrite a satisfactorily
redistributive social state. But they also regard it as a significant source of
injustice, inequality, and waste.122 Smith argues that the left-liberal
egalitarian theorists who offer such claims share an adherence to two
propositions. First, capitalism produces significant externalities that
threaten the realization of liberal values and commitments like meaningful
individual freedom and adequate social equality;123 but, second, such
externalities may be mitigated through the right combination of reform,
redistribution, and institutional design. “[T]he dominant version of left
liberal theory is defined by the following ‘core thesis’: A capitalist market
society is compatible with the institutionalization of [moral equality among
individuals] so long as the systematic tendencies of markets to generate
results incompatible with that principle are put out of play by effective
political regulation.”124 This core thesis is untenable. The valorization
imperative will ultimately undermine attempts to reform, regulate, or
ameliorate the negative social consequences that attend capitalism.
Smith emphasizes capitalism’s inverted social world, in which capital and
labor are enmeshed in a looping relationship of mutual antagonism and
dependence. Workers must sell their capacity to work in order to reproduce
themselves, just as capitalists must exploit workers in order to accumulate
ever more value—or else risk being out-competed by other capitalists. The
continuous unfolding of the capital relation has utterly subordinated social
reproduction as such. The reproduction of the capital relation is not
120. SMITH, supra note 2, at 190-91. See also HEINRICH, supra note 94, at 211 (arguing that “[s]tate
policies are in no way completely determined by the economic situation, but they are also not an open
process in which anything is possible.”).
121. SMITH, supra note 2.
122. Id. at 219-29.
123. Id. at xi.
124. Id. at xii.
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foreordained, of course. “The reproduction of capitalist social relations of
production is only achieved through a class struggle in which their
reproduction is always in doubt” even if the tendency is for such
reproduction to continue apace.125 But the owners of capital can no more
afford to abandon the pursuit of accumulation than the non-owners of
capital can afford to absent themselves from markets for their labor.
“Gaining access to money is not an option to be taken at one’s convenience.
It is an absolute necessity.”126
The fact that the reproduction of the capital relation appears unperturbed
by the expulsion of vast numbers of people from waged work (and hence
the prospects for decent living conditions) illustrates vividly what left-
liberal egalitarians are reluctant to acknowledge: human wants and needs
do not cause capital accumulation; in fact, they are subordinated to it. Their
satisfaction is predicated on the valorization of capital. Capital thwarts such
wants and needs whenever and wherever they present a hindrance to its
expansion. Even the most determined social democratic governments find
that capitalists’ concerns about profitability and the conditions for
continued accumulation become their own.
Left-liberal egalitarians are not a naïve bunch when it comes to
contemporary unfreedom. They “have not jumped on the neoliberal
bandwagon of market triumphalism.”127 Many are strong critics of severe
material inequality precisely because it threatens individuals’ chances for
participation in public life as well as the social bases of self-respect.128
Nevertheless, by failing to offer a critique of capital, left-liberal
egalitarians’ accounts of contemporary injustice are incomplete. The social
pathologies that they identify cannot be indefinitely mitigated within the
crisis-ridden dynamics of capitalism, whose reproduction only obtains
through the constantly accelerating accumulation of value. Any failure of
the reproduction of capitalism results in the massive destruction of value
and the catastrophically violent disruption of social relations.
The crits were consummate critics of legal liberalism, and they were even
less vulnerable to the accusation of being naïfs with respect to domination
and unfreedom than left-liberals are. Nevertheless, CLS’s relationship with
political economy mirrors that of left-liberal egalitarianism. Both CLS and
left-liberal egalitarianism view political institutions and legal norms as the
products of politics (power struggles in the case of CLS; interest-
aggregation or deliberation in the case of left-liberal egalitarianism). But in
both accounts, the political is too often restricted to social relations outside
125. Simon Clarke, The State Debate, in THE STATE DEBATE 1, 63 (Simon Clarke ed., 1991). Compare
id. with Kennedy, supra note 26, at 599 (denying tendential movement within the social totality).
126. SMITH, supra note 2, at 121.
127. Id. at 36.
128. Id. at 10-15. On self-respect see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 386-91, 477-80 (rev. ed.
1999).
22
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol31/iss2/7
2021] Critical Legal Studies and Marx’s Critique 411
of production. The latter is inherently political, acquiring specificity
through struggle. Left-liberals have tended to regard the production and
circulation of commodities as spheres of technique or instrumental reason—
as inevitable, even natural aspects of human societies of given levels of
complexity and organization.129 But neither generalized commodity
production nor other categories specific to capitalist society have trans-
historical validity.
The crits argued that law is an indeterminate array of substantially
contingent political outcomes. They stressed the indeterminacy of legal and
political relations and registered their skepticism regarding the existence of
persistent social structures. But from the vantage point of the Marxian
critique, such skepticism is misdirected. Law and the state are constitutive
moments in the struggle over the reproduction of capitalist social relations.
It may be objected that the crits’ foregrounding of the interpenetration of
law and politics demonstrates a sensitivity to the ways in which struggle
conditions legal relations. But they stressed the indeterminacy and
unpredictability of the political, whereas the Marxian critique approaches
political struggle as both the cause of, and response to, capitalist
domination.
The first wave of CLS could be located to the left, not only of legal
liberalism, but also of the contemporary left-liberal egalitarians that are of
interest to Smith. Smith’s critique is nevertheless applicable to CLS. Much
like left-liberal egalitarians, the crits of the first wave lacked an adequate
conception of capital. Left-liberal egalitarians tend to naturalize the
separation of the economic and the political—or to celebrate its
depoliticizing tendencies as constitutive of liberty. The crits disavowed the
immanent critique of political economy on the grounds that it was
determinist and economistic, thereby arriving at a very similar position. But
the shop floor, the call-center cubicle, the retail counter, and the street are
sites of (inherently political) struggle, even in the absence of active state
intervention or coercion. The legal constitution of those sites ought to be of
urgent interest to anyone pursuing an emancipatory critique of law.
CONCLUSION
Any rigorous attempt to engage in critical legal inquiry today must draw
upon the experience and memory of CLS. I have only offered a glimpse at
the breadth of the crits’ contributions to legal scholarship. Related
currents—such as critical legal history, critical feminist theory, and critical
race theory—continue to thrive and inform scholarly inquiry into the legal
production of difference and domination. The crits’ legacy is salutary and
129. See generally CLARKE, supra note 3, especially at 126-32 (contrasting liberal social theory’s
naturalization of capitalism with Marx’s critique of capitalism’s historically-specific social forms).
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instructive. Their legacy and commitments, however contradictory, can
be recovered and incorporated into emancipatory theory through renewed
attention to the mutual constitution of capital, law, and the state.
That legacy is an inadequate basis for the critique of law’s role in the
constitution of the domination and unfreedom that pervade our society,
however. I have argued that the crits guarded their left flank carefully. Most
crits were either hostile to or unsatisfied with Marxist conceptions of law
and state. As a result, CLS was predicated on an inadequate critique of
political economy. But the critique of law is not separable from the critique
of political economy. Critical legal inquiry must engage with Marx’s
critique rather than ignore or dismiss it.
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